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I. INTRODUCTION
We often take it for granted that ballot box voting is the essence of 
political freedom.  In liberal democracies, it is generally considered the main
way for the people to choose what sort of government policies they will 
live under.
The ballot box indeed has great value. But it also has significant flaws.
As a mechanism of expressing political choice, it leaves much to be desired. 
Individual voters almost never have more than a miniscule chance of making
a difference to the outcome of an election.  And for that very reason, they
have strong incentives to make poorly informed decisions. 
Voting with your feet—or “foot voting”—is in crucial ways a superior 
alternative. You can vote with your feet by deciding to move to a different 
city or state because you prefer its government policies to those in force where
you currently reside.  International migration is also often a form of foot 
voting.  And, as we shall see, many people vote with their feet in the private 
sector, as well. 
Foot voting offers individuals a chance to make decisions that actually 
matter.  And precisely because their choices do matter, foot voters have
every reason to seek out information and use it wisely. 
If you are like most people, you probably spent more time seeking out 
information the last time you bought a television or a smartphone than the 
last time you voted in an election for the presidency or any other political 
office. That is likely because the decision on the TV really makes a difference.
The one you buy will actually be in your living room.  But when you turn 
it on and see the president or prime minister of your country, the chance 
that you can actually influence the selection of that person is utterly
insignificant.
This Article shows how these two advantages of foot voting make it a
powerful tool for expanding political freedom.  This applies to all three
types of foot voting prevalent in the modern world: foot voting between
jurisdictions in a federal system, foot voting through international migration, 
and foot voting in the private sector. Each of these has been the focus of
much controversy.  But they are rarely considered together in a single unified 
framework, and never one that explores their implications for political
freedom.
Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert Lucas famously said that once 
“you start thinking about [economic] growth, . . . it’s hard to think about
anything else.”1  He was referring to the ways in which even modest 
cumulative increases in economic growth can have an immense impact on 
1. A Better Way, ECONOMIST (Oct. 9, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/ 
17173919 [https://perma.cc/R6HK-ZK5A].
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human welfare, because of the way the effects of growth compound over 
time.  Even a 1% increase in annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 
can make a massive difference over a period of several decades.
The same can be said for foot voting and its impact on human freedom. 
Even modest increases in opportunities for people to vote with their feet
can have an enormous impact in expanding liberty and well-being.  For 
both internal and external migrants—especially those who are poor or
fleeing oppression—foot voting is often a life-altering experience that 
massively improves their situation for the better.  Even a 1% increase in
the number of people who have access to major foot voting opportunities 
can make an enormous difference to millions of people. 
Few, if any other policy changes can help so many people so much as 
breaking down barriers to foot voting.  A recent World Bank report concludes 
that, “[i]gnoring the massive economic gains of immigration would be
akin to leaving billions of hundred dollar bills on the sidewalk.”2 Free 
migration throughout the world could potentially double world GDP, a far 
larger gain than from any other possible reform.3 
And that does not include improvements in human rights and “noneconomic” 
elements of well-being. As Harvard economist and former Secretary of 
the Treasury Lawrence Summers puts it, “I do not think there is a more
important development issue than getting questions of migration right.”4 
What is true of development is also, to a large degree, true of human
freedom and well-being more generally.  Increasing opportunities for internal 
foot voting can also potentially generate enormous gains, both economic 
and otherwise.5 
The arguments advanced in this Article do not prove that foot voting 
should be unconstrained in all conceivable circumstances.  Political freedom 
and related issues considered here are not the only ones that need to be 
weighed in assessing policy on foot voting.  But the massive potential
2. CAGLAR OZDEN, MATHIS WAGNER CHRISTOPH & MICHAEL MINH TAM PACKARD,
MOVING FOR PROSPERITY: GLOBAL MIGRATION AND LABOR MARKETS 3 (2018). The phrase is
adapted from Michael A. Clemens, Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills Left
on the Sidewalk?, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 83 (2011). 
3. Clemens, supra note 2, at 88–89. 
4. Lawrence H. Summers, Board Chair, Ctr. for Glob. Dev., Speech at the Center
for Global Development: Rethinking Global Policy for the 21st Century 10 (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://www.cgdev.org/publication/rethinking-global-development-policy-for-the-21st-
century [https://perma.cc/Y66D-ALM5].
5. See generally ILYA SOMIN, FREE TO MOVE: FOOT VOTING AND POLITICAL FREEDOM
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at ch. 2) (on file with Oxford Univ. Press). 
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gains do counsel in favor of expanding foot voting far more than we might 
otherwise. 
To the extent we value political freedom in any significant sense, we 
should also assign a high value to foot voting.  Freedom of choice through 
foot voting, and the freedom of movement that make it possible, cannot 
be absolute principles that always trump other considerations.  But there
should be at least a substantial presumption in their favor. 
My analysis also emphasizes the fundamental similarity between three 
different types of foot voting that are usually considered to be very different
from each other: interjurisdictional foot voting in federal systems, foot voting 
through international migration, and foot voting in the private sector.
Despite some important differences, the three have common virtues, and
help advance political freedom in similar ways. 
Concluding that foot voting is vital to political freedom and often a better 
mechanism of achieving it than ballot box voting does not amount to a 
call for the abolition of democracy.  Far from it.  Democratic government 
is still superior to alternatives such as dictatorship and oligarchy,6 and 
choosing political leaders by elections has value that does not depend 
on its effect on political freedom.  But there are good reasons to constrain and 
structure democracy in ways that increase opportunities for foot voting. 
Part II of the Article provides an overview of the three main types of
foot voting: domestic migration within federal systems, foot voting through
international migration, and foot voting in the private sector.  In Part III, 
I expand on the two major advantages of foot voting over ballot box voting: 
the opportunity to make a decisive choice and the resulting superior incentives 
to make well-informed decisions.  Part IV outlines the advantages of foot 
voting from the standpoint of four major theories of political freedom: 
consent, negative liberty, positive liberty, and nondomination.  In Part V, 
I describe why the advantages of foot voting are not significantly undermined 
by “information shortcuts” and “miracles of aggregation,” which might 
enable ballot box voting to function well even if individual voters have 
low levels of knowledge.  Part VI explains why forms of traditional political
participation beyond voting have many of the same relative weaknesses 
as ballot box voting does.  This Part also summarizes reasons why “deliberative
democracy” is unlikely to overcome the flaws of ballot box voting.  Finally, 
Part VII addresses the objection that foot voting should not be considered 
a legitimate expression of political freedom because it is not truly a form
of “political” decision-making at all. 
6. For an overview, see generally MORTON H. HALPERIN, JOSEPH T. SIEGLE &
MICHAEL M. WEINSTEIN, THE DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE: HOW DEMOCRACIES PROMOTE 
PROSPERITY AND PEACE (revised ed. 2010). 
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In this Article, I do not consider objections to foot voting based on the
idea that the existing residents and governments of the nations or regions 
they move to have a right to exclude.  I take up this issue in my forthcoming
book Free to Move: Foot Voting, Migration, and Political Freedom, from 
which much of the material in this work is excerpted.7 In that book, I also
consider objections based on the idea that expanded foot voting is likely
to have various negative side effects, such as damaging political institutions,
increasing crime, or spreading harmful cultural values.8  The book further 
takes up a wide range of other issues related to foot voting and migration
rights that cannot be covered here. 
II. THREE TYPES OF FOOT VOTING
This Article focuses on three types of foot voting.9  First, people can
vote with their feet by deciding what jurisdiction to live in within a federal 
system, such as a state or local government.  In the United States alone, 
there are fifty states and thousands of local governments that foot voters 
can choose between. Both historically and today, millions of people move 
from one jurisdiction to another at least in part because of preferences over 
public policy. 
A second mechanism for foot voting is international migration, where 
migrants choose what type of government they wish to live under by moving
from one nation to another.  Such nations as the United States, Australia,
Argentina, Canada, and New Zealand were populated primarily by immigrants 
who choose to vote with their feet in hopes of finding greater freedom and
opportunity due in large part to superior government policies in the 
destination country.10 
Foot voting across international boundaries expands choice even more 
than domestic foot voting, because of the vast differences between national 
governments.  The differences in policy and quality of institutions between,
say, Mexico and the United States, are vastly greater than those between
any two American states or any two Mexican ones. 
7. See generally SOMIN, supra note 5 (manuscript at ch. 5). 
8. See generally id. (manuscript at chs. 5–6). 
9. Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, and Political Freedom, in NOMOS LV:
FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 83, 90–91 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014). 
10.  For a wide-ranging overview of the relevant history, see MASSIMO LIVI-BACCI,
A SHORT HISTORY OF MIGRATION 46–69 (Polity Press, 2012). 
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Finally, foot voting also occurs in the private sector, when we decide 
what goods and services we wish to purchase in the market or what civil
society organizations we wish to join.  Such private sector foot voting is
particularly clear in the case of private planned communities and other 
organizations that carry out functions traditionally associated with local
or regional governments, such as security, environmental amenities, and
waste disposal.11  In the United States alone, some sixty-nine million people
lived in private communities as of 2016.12 Such organizations have spread
elsewhere, as well.13 Private planned communities have increasingly taken 
on a wide range of functions historically performed by government.14 
In many cases, foot voting can be undertaken even without physically 
moving from one place to another.  In the private sector, for example, one 
can change schools, join a new civil society organization, or purchase a new 
product or service without ever changing one’s place of residence.15 
The key attribute of foot voting that differentiates it from conventional 
ballot box voting is not movement, as such, but rather the ability to make 
an individually decisive choice.16  Unlike the ballot box voter, whose vote
is just one of many thousands or millions and usually has only a tiny chance
of affecting the outcome, the foot voter can make decisions that have a 
high probability of making a difference.17 
As described in Albert Hirschman’s famous theory of political choice, 
people dissatisfied with a political regime can use either “voice” or “exit” 
to address the situation.18  Ballot box voting is the principle form of voice
in democratic societies, while foot voting is the most significant type of 
exit. This circumstance makes it easy to confuse the distinction between 
foot voting and ballot box voting with Hirschman’s distinction between 
exit and voice. But the two are nonetheless distinct.  Unlike Hirschman’s 
theory, the distinction between foot voting and ballot box voting focuses 
11. For an overview of private planned communities, see generally ROBERT H. NELSON,
PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2005); 
EDWARD PETER STRINGHAM, PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: CREATING ORDER IN ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL LIFE 131–32 (2015). 
12. COMTY. ASS’N INST., NATIONAL AND STATE STATISTICAL REVIEW FOR 2016:
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION DATA 1 (2017), https://www.caionline.org/AboutCommunity
Associations/Statistical%20Information/2016StatsReviewFBWeb.pdf [https://perma.cc/
X7WZ-6ZW2].
13. See generally PRIVATE CITIES: GLOBAL AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES (George Glasze,
Chris Webster & Klaus Frantz eds., 2006). 
14. See generally id.; NELSON, supra note 11. 
15. ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT
IS SMARTER 158–59 (2d ed. 2016). 
16. See id. at 136. 
17. See generally id. at 136–81. 
18. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 3–4 (1970). 
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on the presence or absence of opportunities for individuals to make a
decisive choice, as opposed to one where they have only a tiny chance 
of affecting the outcome.19 By contrast, Hirschman’s framework does not 
distinguish between exit and voice mechanisms that offer a decisive
choice, and those that do not.20 
Foot voting need not always be completely individualistic.  Families 
and businesses, for example, make foot voting decisions that require the
assent of more than one person.21  But in most such cases, there are individuals
who can either make the choice all on their own or at least exercise a high 
degree of influence.22 
The exact point at which an individual’s leverage becomes too small for 
the decision to be considered a case of foot voting rather than ballot box 
voting may be hard to identify. The distinction between the two is, in close 
cases, more a matter of degree than kind.  But the difficulty of drawing a
precise line between the two should not divert attention from the key fact 
that there is an important difference between them and that most important 
real-world cases clearly fall on one side of the divide or the other. 
III. MEANINGFUL, INFORMED CHOICE
Effective freedom requires the ability to make a decisive choice, or at 
least have a high probability of doing so.  It is difficult to claim a person 
has meaningful freedom if they have only a one in one million or one in 
100 million chance of making a decision that changes the outcome.  For 
example, people do not have meaningful religious freedom if they have 
only a one in one million chance of being able to determine which religion 
they wish to practice.  Similarly, people with only a one in one million chance
of deciding what views they are allowed to express surely do not have 
meaningful freedom of speech. 
What is true of freedom of speech and freedom of religion is also true
of political freedom.  Those with only an infinitesimal chance of affecting 
what kind of government policies they are subjected to have little, if any,
genuine political freedom.  And that is exactly the position voters find 
themselves facing in all but the very smallest of elections.  In an American
presidential election, for example, the average voter has only about a one 
19. See SOMIN, supra note 15, at 138. 
20. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 18, at 3–5. 
21. SOMIN, supra note 15, at 146–47. 
22. Id. at 147. 
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in sixty million chance of affecting the outcome.23  In smaller elections, 
the odds are higher, but still generally very low.24 
As political scientist Russell Hardin put it, “[M]ost citizens do not 
typically have the liberty actually to make any difference to their own
welfare through politics.”25 Hardin notes that “if my vote is worthless, . . . 
[h]aving the liberty to cast it is roughly as valuable as having the liberty 
to cast a vote on whether the sun will come up tomorrow.”26  In fairness, 
casting a vote in an election is not completely worthless.  There is a small 
chance that your vote really will change an electoral outcome, and situations 
where an election was tied or won by a single vote have occurred a few 
times in history.27 
The individual voter’s infinitesimally small odds of affecting electoral 
outcomes also undermine political freedom in a second way: it ensures 
that most will not make well-informed decisions.  On many normative views 
of freedom, its effective exercise requires at least a reasonably informed
choice, especially when it comes to important issues. 
Widely accepted standards of medical ethics, for example, require physicians
to secure the patient’s informed consent before performing an operation.28 
As the American Medical Association (AMA) Council on Ethical and Judicial 
Affairs puts it, “[t]he patient’s right of self-decision can be effectively
exercised only if the patient possesses enough information to enable an
informed choice.”29  Like many medical decisions, political choices also are
often literally matters of life and death.  For millions of people, the outcome 
of an election might make the difference between war and peace, wealth
and poverty, or sickness and health. 
Unfortunately, few electoral decisions meet the standard posited by the 
AMA. Ballot box voters have strong incentives to be “rationally ignorant,”
23. Andrew Gelman, Nate Silver & Aaron Edlin, What Is the Probability That Your 
Vote Will Make a Difference?, 50 ECON. INQUIRY 321, 323–24 (2012).  For a more detailed 
discussion of this and alternative methods of estimating the odds that a vote might be 
decisive, see SOMIN, supra note 15, at 75–76.  The bottom line is that the odds of decisiveness 
are low by any reasonable metric. 
24. SOMIN, supra note 15, at 75–76. 
25. RUSSELL HARDIN, HOW DO YOU KNOW? THE ECONOMICS OF ORDINARY KNOWLEDGE
93 (2009).
26. Id.
27. For a discussion of a few examples, see Eric Levenson, Coin Flips, Poker Hands 
and Other Crazy Ways in Which America Settles Tied Elections, CNN (Jan. 4, 2018, 2:12 
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/04/us/tie-elections-history-lots-coins-draws-trnd/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/HCU7-H35R].





SOMIN_56-4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2019 10:56 AM      
  










    








      
     
   
  
 
    
[VOL. 56: 1089, 2019] Foot Voting Enhances Political Freedom 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
because there is so little chance that their votes will matter.30  Survey data
shows that they often lack even very basic knowledge about the candidates 
and policy questions at issue in any given election.31  They also often have 
little incentive to analyze the information they do learn in a logical, unbiased
way. To the contrary, voters have incentives to fall prey to “rational
irrationality”: when there are few or no negative consequences to error, it 
is rational to make almost no effort to control one’s biases.32  For example, 
voters routinely overvalue any evidence that supports their preexisting
views, while downplaying or ignoring anything that cuts the other way.33 
Rational ignorance and rational irrationality affect the decisions of
altruistic voters, as well as those who are narrowly self-interested. Even
a citizen who is strongly motivated to help others still has little incentive 
to devote more than a small amount of effort to acquiring political 
knowledge and trying to rein in her biases.  Whether her purposes are self-
interested or not, the odds that her efforts will pay off are extremely low.
This makes it rational for both egoists and altruists to severely limit the
time and effort devoted to acquiring and analyzing political information.34 
Rational ignorance does not necessarily require careful, calculated decision- 
making.35  In many cases, it involves merely application of crude rules of 
thumb or an intuitive sense that there is little benefit to seeking out additional 
knowledge.  Thus, the idea is not dependent on the assumption that voters 
are hyperlogical or capable of making complex calculations about odds.  
Indeed, such detailed calculation may itself be irrational, since it may require 
more time and effort than can be justified given the likely benefit.36 
Decades of survey data indicate that voter knowledge levels are low, 
and have experienced little or no increase despite rising educational attainment,
and the development of the internet and other modern technology that 
30. See SOMIN, supra note 15, at 75–84. 
31. This part of the chapter builds on my book, Democracy and Political Ignorance:
Why Smaller Government Is Smarter, which analyzes rational ignorance and its consequences 
in great detail.  See generally id. at chs. 1–4. 
 32. See id. at 92-97; BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY 
DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES (2007).
33.  For a review of the evidence, see SOMIN, supra note 15, at 92–97. 
34.  For a more detailed discussion, see id. at 78. 
35. Id. at 79. 
36. For more on these points, see generally Ilya Somin, Rational Ignorance, in
ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF IGNORANCE STUDIES 274 (Matthias Gross & 
Linsey McGoey, eds., 2015). 
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makes information easier to access.37 Often, the majority of the public 
does not know even basic information, such as which party controls Congress, 
what major policies have been enacted, or which elected officials are 
responsible for which issues.38  Just before the 2014 election, in which the
main stake at issue was control of Congress, only 38% of voters knew 
which party controlled the House of Representatives, and a similar percentage 
knew which controlled the Senate.39  Another 2014 survey found that only
36% of Americans can even name the three branches of the federal government: 
the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary.40 
An informed electorate is a public good, in the economic sense of the 
term41: people benefit from its production even if they have not contributed
to its creation, each individual’s contribution is infinitesimally small, and 
the benefits are “nonrivalrous”: my enjoyment of them is not reduced by 
that of other members of society and vice versa.42  Like many other public
goods, it tends to be underproduced, because individuals have strong incentives 
to underinvest in it.  Informed foot voting, by contrast, is largely a private 
good that avoids this problem: individuals have strong incentives to produce 
it for themselves, because they stand to reap the benefits.43 
Foot voting is superior to ballot box voting on both decisiveness and the
incentive to make an informed decision.  It enables the individual decision 
maker to make a meaningful choice.  In the case of people who must move
in tandem with family members, that choice is not completely decisive.
Family members, at least those who are adults, must reach a joint decision
of some kind. But individuals still have vastly greater leverage than in 
almost any ballot box vote.  They can make choices that actually matter, or 
at least have a high probability of doing so. 
And precisely because their decisions do matter, foot voters have strong 
incentives to acquire relevant information and use it wisely.  People deciding
where to live or what choices to make in the marketplace and civil society 
know that their decisions have real consequences, and generally make more 
effort to acquire information.  Considerable empirical evidence backs these
37. For recent overviews of the evidence, see, for example, CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN 
& LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE 
RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT 12–15 (2016); JASON BRENNAN, AGAINST DEMOCRACY 23–53 
(2016); RICK SHENKMAN, JUST HOW STUPID ARE WE? FACING THE TRUTH ABOUT THE 
AMERICAN VOTER 1–13 (2008); SOMIN, supra note 15, at 17–46. 
38.  For numerous examples, see SOMIN, supra note 15, at 17–46. 
39. Id. at 1.
 40. Id. at 20.
41. For more detailed discussion, see id. at 75–82. 
42. Id. at 77. 
43. See generally id. at ch. 5. 
1098
SOMIN_56-4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2019 10:56 AM      
  













   
 




    
    
     
   
[VOL. 56: 1089, 2019] Foot Voting Enhances Political Freedom 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
theoretical predictions, showing that foot voters outperform ballot box
voters even when laboring under difficult conditions.44 
Adam Przeworski, one of world’s leading academic experts on democracy,
laments that “[n]o rule of collective decision making other than unanimity
can render causal efficacy to individual participation.”45  Foot voting is not
perfect on this score.  Among other things, equality of participation is 
constrained by moving costs.46  But it comes far closer than any other 
mechanism. Foot voting can be made available to a very wide range of 
people.  And, unlike ballot box voting, each individual choice is causally 
effective. 
The informational advantages of foot voting loom even larger if we
believe, as some political theorists do, that voters should engage in “deliberative 
democracy” in which they carefully consider opposing arguments and 
moral values, and not just merely cast ballots based on their preferences.47 
Deliberative democracy demands a higher level of knowledge and analytical 
sophistication than more modest versions of democratic theory do.  Rationally 
ignorant voters are even less likely to meet those standards than the less 
severe ones imposed by “aggregative” theories of democratic participation, 
which seek only to ensure that election results roughly reflect voters’ 
preferences.48 
IV. FOOT VOTING AND THEORIES OF POLITICAL FREEDOM
In addition to its general advantages as a tool for meaningful informed
choice, foot voting also trumps ballot box voting under four leading standard
accounts of political freedom: consent, negative freedom, positive freedom,
and nondomination.  In this Article, I do not attempt to resolve the long-
44. Id. at 136–81. 
45. ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE LIMITS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT 111
(2010).
46. For more detailed discussion of this issue, see SOMIN, supra note 15, at 165–69; SOMIN, 
supra note 5 (manuscript at ch. 1). 
47. For defense of deliberative democracy, see generally, for example, JAMES BOHMAN,
PUBLIC DELIBERATION: PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRACY (1996); JOHN S. 
DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS, CONTESTATIONS 
(2000); ROBERT GOODIN, REFLECTIVE DEMOCRACY (2003); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS 
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, 
WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004); ETHAN R. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (2004); James S. 
Fishkin, Deliberative Democracy and Constitutions, 28 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 242 (2011). 
48.  For detailed discussions of this point, see SOMIN, supra note 15, at 58–62. 
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standing disagreements between advocates of these different views.  The 
case for foot voting is strong under all four approaches. 
A. Consent 
At least since John Locke and Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth
century, many political theorists have argued that the authority of the state 
is legitimized by consent.49  Ballot box voting is often seen as an indicator 
of such consent.50  But, as critics have pointed out, it does not truly signify 
meaningful consent because, among other things, those who choose not 
to vote are not thereby exempt from the state’s authority.51 
Many claim that living in a territory controlled by a government constitutes
“tacit consent” to its authority.  Some theorists argue that the consent becomes 
more binding if residents accept the benefits of various government services,
such as police, fire protection, welfare payments, and others.52  This argument 
has a venerable history, dating back at least to Plato’s Crito.53  But it is
ultimately unsound.  As the saying goes, tacit consent is not worth the paper 
it isn’t printed on. 
The key flaw in the theory is that it assumes the validity of the very
point that it is meant to prove: that government has the right to enact laws 
of a particular type in the first place.  If mere physical or political control 
of a given territory gives the state the power to issue commands as it wishes,
then of course residents are required to follow those laws.  But the existence
of such a right is in no way demonstrated merely because individuals have 
chosen not to leave the area, or benefit from some of the services the
government offers. 
Consider the case of an organized crime boss who has established a
“territory” and has the physical power to punish area residents who disobey 
his decrees.54  Assume, further, that the residents benefit from some “services”
49. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1991) (1651); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
50. See generally, e.g., J.P.PLAMENATZ,CONSENT,FREEDOM, ANDPOLITICAL OBLIGATION
(2d ed. 1968); PETER J. STEINBERGER, THE IDEA OF THE STATE 218 (2004).
51. See MICHAEL HUEMER, THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY: AN EXAMINATION 
OF THE RIGHT TO COERCE AND THE DUTY TO OBEY 59–80 (2013); A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL 
PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 136–39 (1979).
52. See STEINBERGER, supra note 50, at 219–20. 
53. In Crito, Socrates argues that he is required to obey Athens’ laws because he
chose not to leave the city.  See generally PLATO, Crito, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF 
PLATO 27 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Hugh Trednnick trans., Princeton 
Univ. Press 1989) (399 B.C.E.). 
54. See Ilya Somin, Creation, Consent, and Government Power Over Property Rights, 
CATO UNBOUND (Dec. 13, 2010), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2010/12/13/ilya-somin/ 
creation-consent-government-power-over-property-rights [https://perma.cc/QA4E-7E79].
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he provides, such as suppressing rival mobsters.  Do residents have a moral 
obligation to obey his dictates or pay taxes to him whenever he demands 
it, because they have “consented” to it? 
Obviously not, since the boss never had a moral right to issue such
commands in the first place.  The fact that people choose to live in the
territory he claims does not establish that they have consented to obey him 
in any morally significant sense.  What is true for organized crime bosses
is also true for governments: the mere fact that a government establishes 
control over a territory and at least some residents do not choose to leave 
does not prove that they are required to obey the government’s dictates 
with respect to their property rights. 
Perhaps the tacit consent argument becomes stronger if the government 
in question is democratic, and residents can express their will at the ballot 
box. Even if mere residency is not enough to prove consent, perhaps participation
in democratic elections is.  This narrower version of consent theory is
more appealing than one that would give carte blanche to authoritarian
rulers as well as democratic ones.  But it still suffers from the same flaws 
as its more sweeping cousin.  It too assumes the validity of the point it is
intended to prove.  The fact that a majority of residents have voted for
a government that enacts a particular set of laws does not prove that either 
the majority or its representatives were morally entitled to make such
decisions in the first place.
This is particularly true if at least some of the residents never agreed to 
be ruled by the winners of the election, and never had a chance to vote on 
the logically prior question of whether they accept the underlying structure of
the electoral system.  Consenting to take part in an already established electoral 
process does not mean that the voter consented to allow the winners of the
election to control any specific set of decisions. 
Once a political system is established, one can rationally choose to vote 
for the “lesser evil” among the available candidates even if one would 
prefer that the relevant government not exist at all or have much more limited 
powers.  Any “consent” entailed by choosing to vote is further undercut
if the winners of the election exercise authority over nonvoting residents 
as well as those who chose to participate. 
Consider the following modification to my crime boss example.  Imagine
that the Corleone and Barzini Mafia families of Godfather fame each claimed
to control a territory somewhere in New York City,55 but agreed among 
55. MARIO PUZO, THE GODFATHER (1969). 
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themselves that the right to reallocate property rights in the area would 
accrue to whichever of the two crime families won a majority of the residents’
votes in a referendum.  Let us say they allow a new referendum to take place
every four years.  Maybe they even permit other Mafia families to compete 
in their elections so long as they follow the electoral rules initially established 
by the Barzinis and Corleones.  Few would contend that the Barzini–Corleone 
cartel is justified merely because their willingness to hold occasional elections 
proves that the residents have consented to let them tax and regulate at will.
Democracy is a useful tool for imposing accountability on government. 
The democratic Mafia cartel I envision is likely to be less oppressive than 
the more authoritarian system described earlier.  But democracy does not 
by itself justify untrammeled government control over anyone who happens
to live in a given area.
Foot voting is superior to ballot box voting as an indicator of consent, 
because those who move out of a jurisdiction really can escape all—or at
least most—of its laws.  It is still not entirely clear what, if anything, gives 
the government the right to claim initial authority over the territory it
controls. But such authority is more consensual, or at least less coercive,
the more those subject to it have opportunities to avoid its reach. 
The degree of consensuality here is significantly reduced by moving costs. 
But greater decentralization can mitigate that, at least to a substantial degree.
Foot voting is less costly when moving from state to state than internationally, 
and less costly still when choosing between localities or between private 
sector alternatives.56 
Private sector foot voting potentially offers even greater options, and
even lower moving costs than greatly decentralized government.  In many
cases, we can switch providers of private sector services without physically 
moving at all.57  When choosing between private planned communities, there
can often be numerous options within a short distance of each other.58 
While expanded foot voting might not make political power fully 
consensual, it comes closer than ballot box voting.  The more foot voting
options we have, and the greater the ease of exercising them, the more
consensual government becomes. 
Foot voting may be the only possible avenue to make government more 
consensual for the large percentage of the world’s population that lives 
under nondemocratic regimes.  Freedom House estimates that some 37% 
of the world’s people live in “not free” undemocratic nations, and another
56. See generally SOMIN, supra note 5 (manuscript at ch. 2). 
57. See generally id. (manuscript at chs. 2, 4).
58. See generally id. (manuscript at ch. 4).
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24% in ones that are only “partly free”—only partly democratic.59  In such 
regimes, most residents have even less leverage over government policy 
than individual voters in a Western liberal democracy do. 
B. Negative Freedom
Another possible approach to political freedom links it to “negative” 
freedom more generally: people have greater political freedom to the
extent that they can minimize unwanted government interference with
their choices.60  Here too, foot voting offers greater protection than ballot
box voting: the ability to completely, or at least largely, avoid unwanted 
interference creates greater negative freedom than the ability to cast a vote 
that has only an infinitesimal chance of having an impact. 
It is also important to remember that restrictions on freedom of movement 
are themselves a major imposition on negative freedom.  When governments 
block would-be migrants from entering or leaving, they prevent millions 
of people from freely contracting with willing residents who wish to employ
them, rent property to them, and otherwise interact with the would-be
migrants.61  They forcibly confine large numbers of people to a lifetime
of poverty and oppression in the third world.  Few government interventions 
in the market and civil society restrict the negative freedom of so many 
people so severely. 
C. Positive Freedom
Many modern political thinkers argue for a more “positive” approach
to freedom that focuses on “capabilities”: on this view, freedom is not just 
noninterference but the actual ability to exercise autonomy, pursue your 
preferred projects, and enhance your capacities.62 
59. MICHAEL J. ABRAMOWITZ, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018:
DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS 2 (2018), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-
world-2018 [https://perma.cc/UQX2-ZXDC].
60. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,STATE, AND UTOPIA (2013), for a leading 
modern work in this vein. 
61. On the ways in which migration restrictions violate negative freedom, see generally
Michael Huemer, Is There a Right to Immigrate?, 36 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 429 (2010). 
62. See generally, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999); PHILIPPE 
VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL: WHAT (IF ANYTHING) CAN JUSTIFY CAPITALISM? (1995); 
Charles Taylor, What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF ISAIAH BERLIN 175 (Alan Ryan ed., 1979).  But cf. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts 
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Here too, foot voting often offers better prospects than ballot box voting.
Admittedly, the connection here is much more equivocal than with consent,
negative freedom, and nondomination (discussed below).  At least in theory, 
a policy enacted through ballot box voting could potentially enhance positive
freedom for many people to a much greater extent than is possible through 
any realistically feasible foot voting options.  Nonetheless, foot voting often 
offers better opportunities than ballot box voting.
A foot voter can potentially choose between a wide variety of governmental 
and private alternatives that might help him or her develop capabilities 
and pursue a range of possible projects.  By contrast, most ballot box voters 
have almost no control over options available to them. Moreover, foot 
voters are more likely to make well-informed and unbiased choices than
ballot box voters.63  Widespread political ignorance, which is even greater 
among the poor and disadvantaged than among other voters,64 often prevents
the enactment of policies that might genuinely enhance positive freedom, 
while incentivizing many that perversely undermine it. 
Some poor and disadvantaged people may need redistributive programs 
to develop their capabilities and to exercise positive freedom more fully.
This Article does not try to address the extent to which redistribution
is desirable or morally essential for such purposes.65 But it is important
to stress that foot voting is itself a powerful mechanism for increasing the 
income and economic well-being of the poor, often a more powerful one
than any form of redistribution. Foot voting opportunities have been of 
special value to the poor and oppressed and tend to benefit them even more 
than the relatively well off.66 
International migration is a particularly potent tool for enhancing positive 
freedom.  Economists estimate that allowing free migration throughout the 
world would likely double world GDP.67  Much of that benefit would go to
migrants from poor nations where their opportunities to enhance their 
capacities would otherwise be severely limited at best.  As in the case of
negative freedom, the effects are enormous, often doubling or tripling the
income of the migrants in question.68  It is difficult to think of any other
of Liberty, in LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 166 (Henry Hardy ed., 
1969).
63. See generally SOMIN, supra note 15, at 119–54. 
64. See id. at 38–61. 
65. For an explanation of how greatly expanded foot voting is compatible with extensive
redistribution, see SOMIN, supra note 5 (manuscript at ch. 2). 
66. See id. (manuscript at chs. 2, 3). 
67. See Clemens, supra note 2, at 84. 
68. For estimates of the massive effects of migration on the income of emigrants
from poor nations, see generally Michael Clemens & Lant Pritchett, Income Per Natural: 
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policy change that would enhance positive freedom for so many people so
quickly.
For both positive and negative freedom, the benefits of foot voting go far 
beyond the narrowly “economic.”  Expanded foot voting opportunities can
also massively enhance migrants’ freedom and well-being more generally. 
Consider, for example, women fleeing patriarchal societies, religious minorities 
fleeing oppression, and people fleeing repressive tyrannical regimes of various 
kinds.
From the standpoint of enhancing positive freedom by expanding human
capabilities,69 the noneconomic benefits of foot voting may be just as 
important as the enhancement of productivity, conceived in narrow economic 
terms. In many cases, escaping noneconomic oppression enables migrants 
to enormously enhance their capacities in a variety of ways.  The full scope 
of these effects is probably impossible to quantify.  But there is little doubt 
that they are massive. 
D. Nondomination
Some scholars argue that the true essence of political freedom is
“nondomination”: the state of being free from the arbitrarily imposed will 
of others.70  Philip Pettit, a leading advocate of nondomination theory,
describes its objective as the absence of “involuntary exposure to the will 
of others” and the securing of “the freedom that goes with not having to 
live under the potentially harmful power of another.”71  By this standard, too,
foot voting trumps ballot box voting.72 In most cases, individual ballot 
box voter finds herself under the complete domination of whichever political 
forces prevail in electoral competition—at least with respect to whatever 
issues come within the control of democratic government.  And she generally 
has only an infinitesimal chance of changing any of their policies.  If a 
Measuring Development for People Rather than Places, 34 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 395
(2008).
69. See generally, e.g., SEN, supra note 62. 
70. See generally, e.g., JAMES L. FISHKIN, TYRANNY AND LEGITIMACY: A CRITIQUE
OF POLITICAL THEORIES (1979); PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN 
THEORY AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY (2012) [hereinafter PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS]; 
PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (1999) [hereinafter 
PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM]. 
71. PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS, supra note 70, at 2, 5.
72. For a somewhat similar critique of democracy from the standpoint of nondomination 
theory, see BRENNAN, supra note 37, at 95–99. 
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dictator controls important aspects of your life, but gives you a one in 100
million chance of changing his decisions, it is pretty obvious that you are 
dominated by him.  The same is true if a democratic majority controls your 
life in the same way.
In most cases, domination by a democratic majority is likely to be more 
benevolent and less onerous than domination by a dictator.  But relatively
benevolent domination is domination nonetheless. A benevolent dictator
who honestly seeks to improve the lot of his subjects still exercise 
domination over them.  Nondomination theorists explicitly emphasize that 
benevolence does not vitiate domination—indeed that domination is 
present even if rulers merely have the ability to exercise power over their
subjects, but never actually use it.73  The same is true of a democratic majority
that similarly strives for benevolence, or even one that simply chooses not 
to exercise its authority, despite having the power to do so. 
Pettit contends that a democratic regime can avoid domination if its 
citizens enjoy “equality of influence” and the exercise of power is limited 
by institutional constraints, such as separation of powers, judicial review, 
and various political norms.74  It is difficult to see how equality of influence
can prevent domination.  Even if citizens have exactly the same amount 
of political influence, each is still dominated by the political majority in 
so far as they have little or no chance to change policy.  The fact that 
everyone else is similarly dominated does not change this basic situation. 
Institutional constraints on the exercise of power can potentially reduce 
domination by making it more difficult to enact laws and regulations and
—in the case of judicial review—by potentially eliminating some issues
from the scope of governmental authority entirely.  For example, judicial 
review might forbid restrictions on freedom of speech or religion.
Nonetheless, individual citizens are still dominated within whatever 
sphere the government remains able to pass laws.  In the case of separation
of powers or supermajority rules, the institutional constraints in question
merely increase the number of people who must agree to a given exercise
of authority. For example, in a bicameral system, a law might have to be
passed by both houses of the legislature.  In a presidential system, it might 
also require the concurrence of the executive.  Such limitations may have 
great value. But they do not necessarily reduce the scope of state power, 
nor the extent to which those who wield it exercise domination over the 
citizenry. 
73. See, e.g., PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS, supra note 70, at 64–74 (arguing that
mere “noninterference” is not enough to avoid domination if rulers in fact have the authority to 
impose restrictions on their subjects, but merely choose not to use it). 
74. See generally id. at 239–92. 
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For Pettit, the institution of slavery epitomizes domination, because the 
master enjoys vast power to interfere with the slave’s choices “with impunity 
and at will,” and the slave has no ability to avoid the master’s authority.75 
Presumably, a slave is  still dominated even if he is not owned not by an 
individual master, but by a group who make decisions by majority vote, 
or, say, by a two-thirds supermajority.  Within slavery, domination is likewise 
still present even if the master is limited by laws and norms that restrict 
the range of punishments he can inflict on those who refuse his orders.
Some restrictions of this type actually did exist in the antebellum South,76 
yet surely no one could seriously claim that the slaves were thereby freed
from domination.
Similarly, the fact that the powers of a democratic state may be constrained 
by institutional limits or norms does not eliminate domination within whatever 
sphere the government still controls. Separation of powers, bicameralism,
and other similar institutions might make it more difficult to exercise 
power, but do not eliminate its existence.
Pettit’s appeal to the importance of “norms”77 actually has much in
common with defenses of dictatorship and oligarchy that rely on the 
benevolence of the rulers to protect the people.  Kings, aristocrats, oligarchs, 
and other nondemocratic rulers are also usually constrained by norms of 
various types, including some that are strongly internalized.  Yet that is not 
enough, on Pettit’s theory, to free their subjects from domination.  The same 
is true of democratic governments that are also constrained by norms. 
Democracy is superior to dictatorship in many ways, and ballot box
voting plays an important role in maintaining that superiority.78  But it cannot
ensure political freedom defined as nondomination. 
By contrast, foot voting does much better.  If extensive opportunities 
for foot voting are institutionalized, the foot voter can often use exit rights 
to escape unwanted impositions, and thereby greatly reduce conditions of 
domination, even if not completely eliminate them. 
If foot voters can choose from a variety of options, they are no longer
subject to domination by the will of any individual ruler, employer, or political
majority.  At the very least, they face far less risk of domination than a
75. See, e.g., Philip Pettit, Freedom as Antipower, 106 ETHICS 576, 578–81 (1996). 
76. See, e.g., KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE 
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 141–50 (1956). 
77. PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS, supra note 70, at 263–74. 
78. See generally e.g., HALPERIN, SIEGLE & WEINSTEIN, supra note 6.
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person whose only recourse is ballot box voting.79  The slave who can 
refuse the master’s orders and escape his control is no longer a slave at all, 
and thereby freed from domination—at least to a large extent.  The same 
goes for a citizen who can use foot voting to avoid the dictates of democratic 
government. 
V. INFORMATION SHORTCUTS AND “MIRACLES OF AGGREGATION” 
Some scholars argue that we need not worry much about widespread 
political ignorance, because voters can use “information shortcuts” to make
good decisions—small bits of knowledge that substitute for larger bodies 
of information they do not know.80  Alternatively, even if individual voters 
tend to be ignorant, the electorate as a whole might still make good decisions, 
because of its high level of aggregate knowledge: the so-called “miracle 
of aggregation.”81  If true, these theories might diminish voter ignorance 
concerns about ballot box voting.  Unfortunately, however, they are not 
nearly as compelling as advocates claim. 
I have criticized both shortcut theories and miracle of aggregation arguments 
in detail in my book, Democracy and Political Ignorance.82  Here, I will 
only emphasize a few key points. 
A. Information Shortcuts 
There are many types of information shortcuts that advocates claim can
substitute for more extensive political knowledge.  Perhaps the best known 
example is so-called “retrospective voting,” under which voters can choose 
to reelect or remove incumbents based on whether things have improved 
under their rule or not.  In theory, retrospective voters need not know 
79. For a recent discussion of the ways in which exit rights facilitate nondomination 
that makes similar arguments, see generally ROBERT S. TAYLOR, EXIT LEFT: MARKETS AND 
MOBILITY IN REPUBLICAN THOUGHT (2017).
80. See, e.g., Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting
Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 63 (1994). 
81. See e.g., ROBERT S. ERIKSON, MICHAEL B. MACKUEN & JAMES A. STIMSON, THE
MACRO POLITY 428–29 (2002); HÉLÈNE LANDEMORE, DEMOCRATIC REASON: POLITICS, 
COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE RULE OF THE MANY 156–59 (2013); JAMES SUROWIECKI, 
THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW 
COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS 259–71 
(2004); DONALD A. WITTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE: WHY POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFICIENT (1995); Bernard Grofman & Julie Withers, Information-
Pooling Models of Electoral Politics, in INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION, AND CHOICE: AN 
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE 55 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1993); 
James A. Stimson, A Macro Theory of  Information Flow, in INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC 
PROCESSES 345–68 (John A. Ferejohn & James H. Kuklinski eds., 1990). 
82. SOMIN, supra note 15, at 90–112. 
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anything about the details of government policy or party platforms.  As 
one advocate puts it, “[i]n order to ascertain whether the incumbents have 
performed poorly or well, citizens need only calculate the changes in their
own welfare.”83  Ronald Reagan effectively captured this idea during the
1980 presidential election, when he famously said that in order to figure 
out who to support, voters need only ask themselves “are you better off 
than you were four years ago?”84  Other shortcut theories emphasize the
potential value of knowledge gained from everyday life,85 identification 
of candidates with political parties,86 and cues from trusted “opinion leaders”
—people who have similar values to the voters, but superior knowledge 
of policy issues, and therefore can potentially function as intermediaries 
for guiding voter decisions.87 
Despite their variety, shortcut theories share two common flaws: they 
often require considerable preexisting knowledge to use effectively, and they
do not address the problem of “rational irrationality”—voters’ bias in the 
evaluation of information.88 
For example, effective retrospective voting requires understanding what 
issues particular incumbents are responsible for, and what impact they
have had on them.  If voters are ignorant on these points, they could easily
end up rewarding and punishing incumbents for events they did not cause, 
while overlooking those they do have an impact on. 
Sadly, that is exactly what happens in most elections.  Voters routinely
reelect or defeat incumbents based on short-term economic trends they
have little if any control over.89  Voters also punish incumbents for a wide
range of other events they cannot control, including shark attacks, droughts, 
83. MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 
5 (1981).  For an early classic defense of retrospective voting, see V.O. KEY, JR., THE RESPONSIBLE 
ELECTORATE: RATIONALITY IN PRESIDENTIAL VOTING 1936–1960, at 60–61 (1966). 
84. LOU CANNON, GOVERNOR REAGAN: HIS RISE TO POWER 547 n.26 (2003). 
85. See, e.g., SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND
PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 7–11, 17–18 (1991). 
86. See, e.g., JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION 
OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 48–49 (1995); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY 
OF DEMOCRACY 96–141 (1957).
87. See generally, e.g., ARTHUR LUPIA & MATTHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC 
DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (1998).  I criticized their 
analysis in my review of their book.  See generally Ilya Somin, Resolving the Democratic 
Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 401 (1999) (reviewing LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra). 
88. See generally CAPLAN, supra note 32. 
89. See ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 37, at 90–212; Andrew Leigh, Does the World 
Economy Swing National Elections?, 71 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 163, 163–65 (2009). 
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and even local sports team victories.90  Similarly, voters also often fail to 
understand which office holders are responsible for which issues, and 
thereby attribute responsibility to the wrong officials.91 
The effectiveness of retrospective voting is also often undermined by 
bias in the evaluation of information.92  The theory implicitly assumes that 
voters objectively consider the state of the world and then judge incumbent 
politicians by what they see.  But, in reality, the reverse is often true.  Partisan 
and other biases often skew perceptions of underlying reality, causing 
voters to believe that conditions are better than they really are when their 
preferred party is in power, and worse than they are when the opposing 
party is.93  For example, Republicans tend to believe that inflation and 
unemployment are higher than is actually the case when a Democrat is in
the White House, while Democratic voters have the opposite bias.94 
When voters reward and punish incumbents for things they did not do
or act on highly biased perceptions of reality, retrospective voting not only 
fails to offset voter ignorance.  It may even make the situation worse than
before. 
Similar problems beset other information shortcuts.95  They too often
require information that most voters do not know, and they too routinely 
fall prey to biases exacerbated by rational irrationality. 
90. See CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, UCLA INT’L. INST., BLIND
RETROSPECTION: ELECTORAL RESPONSES TO DROUGHT, FLU, AND SHARK ATTACKS 1 
(2004), http://www.international.ucla.edu/media/files/PERG.Achen.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6KG8-VZ9G]; SOMIN, supra note 15, at 3–4; Andrew J. Healy, Neil Malhotra & Cecilia 
Hyunjung Mo, Irrelevant Events Affect Voters’ Evaluations of Government Performance,
107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12,804, 12,804–07 (2010); Andrew Healy & Neil Malhotra, 
Random Events, Economic Losses, and Retrospective Voting: Implications for Democratic 
Competence, 5 Q.J. POL. SCI. 1, 3 (2010). 
91. SOMIN, supra note 15, at 119.  See generally Bryan Caplan et al., Systematically
Biased Beliefs About Political Influence: Evidence from the Perceptions of Political Influence 
on Policy Outcomes Survey, 46 AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 760, 765 (2013). 
92. Larry M. Bartels, Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions, 
24 POL. BEHAV. 117, 125 (2002). 
93. See, e.g., id.; see also, e.g., DONALD GREEN, BRADLEY PALMQUIST & ERIC 
SHICKLER, PARTISAN HEARTS AND MINDS: POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES 
OF VOTERS 110–11 (2002); Michael Marsh & James Tilley, The Attribution of Credit and 
Blame to Governments and Its Impact on Vote Choice, 40 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 115, 116 
(2009); Thomas J. Rudolph, Triangulating Political Responsibility: The Motivated Formation 
of Responsibility Judgments, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 99, 104–05 (2006); Christopher H. Achen 
& Larry M. Bartels, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association: It Feels Like We’re Thinking: The Rationalizing Voter and Electoral Democracy 
3–4 (Aug. 28, 2006).  For recent overviews of this evidence, see ACHEN & BARTELS, supra 
note 37, at 280–81; SOMIN, supra note 15, at 120–21. 
94. Bartels, supra note 92, at 124–25. 
95.  For detailed discussion, see SOMIN, supra note 15, at 107–27. 
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Shortcuts are by no means completely useless.  In some situations, they 
can help voters make good decisions. For example, retrospective voting
can be effective in situations where incumbents have failed in large and 
obvious ways, such as by losing a war or deliberately causing a famine.96 
But most government policies are more complicated than this, and require 
greater knowledge to understand and assess.97 
B. Miracles of Aggregation? 
Even if most individual voters are generally ignorant, the electorate as
a whole could potentially make well-informed decisions.  One possible 
mechanism by which this could happen is that poorly informed voters could 
cancel each other out, thereby enabling the well-informed minority to control 
electoral outcomes.98 
Assume, for example, that an electorate of ten million voters is choosing
between a Democratic candidate and a Republican one, and that 90% of 
them are poorly informed, and make decisions based on ignorance.  If their 
ignorance-driven errors are randomly distributed, then almost exactly half 
of the ignorant group—45% of the total electorate—will choose the 
Democratic candidate based on their flawed reasoning, and a similar number 
—also 45% of the total—will choose the Republican.  Poorly informed votes 
for the Democrats will be offset by poorly informed votes for Republicans, 
leaving the true outcome to be determined by the knowledgeable minority 
of 10%, who—by assumption—have a far better understanding of the issues 
at stake.
Another way in which the collective electorate might make good decisions
despite the ignorance of individual voters is by taking advantage of its
superior aggregate knowledge.99  A large group with a low average level of
knowledge might nonetheless have a high level of total knowledge, perhaps 
higher than that of a smaller group in which each individual knows far more 
than the average member of the larger group.  For example, a group of 100 
voters, each of whom knows one unit of information, has a higher total 
96. See id. at 118. 
97.  For far more extensive analysis, see id. at 90–118. 
98. For miracle of aggregation theories of this kind, see, for example, WITTMAN,
supra note 81, at 16–17; Philip E. Converse, Popular Representation and the Distribution 
of Information, in INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 381, 382–83 (John Ferejohn 
& James Kuklinski eds., 1990). 
99. For a prominent recent defense of this sort of theory, see LANDEMORE, supra note 
81, at 156–57. 
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level of knowledge than a group of ten people, each of whom knows five
units.  Although the average member of the smaller group knows five times 
more than the average member of the larger one, the latter still has twice as 
much total knowledge—100 units—as the former—50 units. In this way,
“diversity trumps ability”; a large, diverse group, can know more than a 
smaller, more expert one.100 
Unfortunately, neither of these versions of miracle of aggregation theory 
even comes close to accurately describing real world electorates.  The first 
version fails because real world errors caused by ignorance rarely cancel
each other out, because they are rarely randomly distributed. Errors in
one direction tend to be more common than those in the other.  And in a 
large group, if one type of error is even slightly more common than the
other, it will almost certainly be decisive in determining the outcome.101 
In addition, the knowledgeable minority that supposedly determines the 
outcome when effects of ignorance are indeed random is often highly
unrepresentative of the larger electorate; for example, its members tend to
be wealthier, and more likely to be white and male than the American
electorate as a whole.102 
The “diversity trumps ability” version of aggregation theory also turns
out to be overly optimistic.  Among other flaws, it assumes that voters 
have enough basic general knowledge of the political system to be able to 
properly assess the ways in which their more specific individual knowledge 
applies to the issues at stake in an election.  As Hélène Landemore, a
leading academic advocate of the theory, puts it, diversity is only likely to
“trump” individual knowledge if the participants in the diverse group are
“relatively smart (or not too dumb).”103 
In addition, the theory also assumes that individual voters make their 
decisions objectively and independently based on their own private knowledge, 
as opposed to being influenced by the views of others, and by cognitive
biases of the sort incentivized by rational irrationality.104  Neither assumption 
holds true in most real world situations.  Voters are routinely influenced 
by misconceptions widespread in society, and their evaluation of political 
information is often highly biased.105  Even relatively small biases of this
kind can easily unsettle the “diversity trumps ability theory” and cause a 
100.  See id. at 89–90, 102, 117. 
101.  For a more detailed discussion of these points, see SOMIN, supra note 15, at
128–29. 
102. See id. at 130–31. 
103. LANDEMORE, supra note 81, at 102. 
104.  For a discussion of rational irrationality, see supra Part III. 
105.  For more extensive analyses of these points, see SOMIN, supra note 15, at 123– 
33; Ilya Somin, Why Political Ignorance Undermines the Wisdom of the Many, 26 CRITICAL 
REV. 151, 154–55, 162 (2014). 
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large group with low average levels of information to make serious systematic 
106errors. 
VI. DELIBERATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION “BEYOND VOTING” 
Ballot box voting is not the only way citizens can influence government 
policy in a democratic political system.  They can also do so by engaging in 
political speech, activism, demonstrations, lobbying, campaign contributions, 
and other such activities.107  Does the availability of such options mitigate
the shortcomings of ballot box voting as a mechanism of political freedom?  
If so, it could reduce or even completely eliminate the advantages of foot 
voting.  Unfortunately, such a happy scenario is both empirically dubious 
and, in some ways, impossible even in theory.  The same goes for efforts 
to mitigate political ignorance and enhance political freedom by increasing 
opportunities for deliberation. 
A. Political Participation “Beyond Voting”
In some cases, participation “beyond voting” surely does enable individual 
citizens to increase their influence over policy.  Prominent activists,
intellectuals, campaign donors, and others surely have influence far greater
than that of the average voter.  Nonetheless, participation beyond voting does
not and cannot overcome the difficulties inherent in the insignificance of any
one vote to electoral outcomes.
One problem is that participation beyond voting is very unequally 
distributed. A recent study found that only about 25% of American voters 
engage in such activities at all.108  Those who participate in this way differ
from the rest of the population in terms of both policy preferences and
background characteristics, such as income, race, and gender.109 
If political participation beyond voting is unequally distributed, and largely
confined to a relatively small minority of the population, its effect is to
increase the political leverage of some people only by reducing that of others.
106. LANDEMORE, supra note 81, at 102; SOMIN, supra note 15, at 116. 
107. Jennifer Oser, Jan E. Leighley & Kenneth M. Winneg, Participation, Online and
Otherwise: What’s the Difference for Policy Preferences?, 95 SOC. SCI. Q. 1259, 1260 (2014). 
108. See id. at 1268. 
109. See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
THE NEW GILDED AGE 19 (2008); SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & HENRY E. 
BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 463–65 (1995); 
Oser, Leighley & Winneg, supra note 107, at 1260–61. 
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A simple example illustrates the point: Imagine an electorate that consists 
of one million citizens.  Initially, the only way any of them can influence 
electoral outcomes is by casting votes at the ballot box.  But due to a 
technological change or an increase in her capabilities, one member of the
electorate, Smith, manages to increase her influence by a factor of 1000. 
She now has as much electoral clout as 1000 conventional voters previously
did. This greatly increases her odds of affecting electoral outcomes.  But 
it also proportionately reduces the leverage of everyone else, which is 
diminished to the exact same degree as Smith’s influence is increased. 
The same point applies if Smith’s increased influence takes the form of 
affecting policymaking by pathways other than influencing electoral results. 
The more influence she has over policy, the less is available to everyone 
else.
Given enormous differences in capabilities, opportunities, and interest 
in politics, it is difficult to see how inequality in participation beyond voting 
can be eliminated, or even reduced to a low level.  To the contrary, it seems
likely to persist in any society where there are substantial inequalities
in wealth, ability, acquired skills, and political interest. 
But even in a world where participation beyond voting was completely 
equalized, the problem of the insignificance of individual voters’ influence
would still persist.  If each person had exactly the same ability to exercise 
influence by using methods other than voting, then each individual’s 
influence beyond voting would be insignificant for much the same reasons 
as each individual vote currently is.  In a society where each individual vote
has only a one in sixty million chance of influencing electoral outcomes,110 
each person’s participation beyond voting would have exactly the same
odds of determining the result if such participation were equalized to the 
same degree as voting is.  The same goes for opportunities to influence policy 
by means other than affecting election results, so long as those opportunities 
are also equally distributed. 
The fundamental problem is that political influence is a zero-sum game. 
If some people gain more of it, it can only be by reducing the influence of 
others. In a dictatorship or oligarchy, the rulers have enormous political 
influence, but only by denying access to power to all or most of the rest of the
population.  The same is true, albeit to a less extreme degree, in a democracy 
where some citizens wield far greater influence than others. 
In a hypothetical society where political influence is equally distributed, 
such equality can only be guaranteed, if at all, only by simultaneously
ensuring that the leverage of each individual is infinitesimally small.  The 
only exception might be a society with an extremely small population,
110. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
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where each individual vote is likely to have greater significance.  But such
small micropolities probably cannot handle many of the larger-scale issues 
that arise in modern societies.111 
If participation beyond voting does not eliminate the insignificance of 
any single vote, it also cannot mitigate the problem of rational ignorance.
Currently, people who participate beyond voting have somewhat higher 
levels of political knowledge than the rest of the population.112  But this is
unlikely to hold true in a society where such participation is equally distributed.
In that world, each person’s influence beyond voting would be just as 
infinitesimal as their influence at the ballot box.  Neither would provide
much incentive to achieve more than minimal levels of political knowledge. 
Moreover, those most interested in politics—the people most likely to 
engage in political participation beyond voting—also tend to be the most 
biased in their evaluation of the information they do know.113 By engaging
emotions such as partisan bias and hatred of political opponents, participation 
beyond voting may actually lead to more poorly informed decision-making, 
even if those involved in the process know more facts. 
B. Increasing Knowledge Through Deliberation 
In recent years, a number of scholars have argued that we can greatly
mitigate the problem of political ignorance by increasing opportunities for 
deliberation.114 Such proposals come in two general types.  Some try to
get the entire population to engage in greater deliberation, and thereby increase 
their understanding of the issues they vote on.  For example, Bruce Ackerman 
and James Fishkin’s “Deliberation Day” proposal would establish a national 
day during which voters across the nation would be incentivized to hear 
presentations about the issues at stake in an upcoming election, and deliberate 
111. For a discussion of this possibility, see Ilya Somin, Deliberative Democracy
and Political Ignorance, 22 CRITICAL REV. 253, 271–72 (2010). 
112. See VERBA, SCHLOZMAN & BRADY, supra note 109, at 512, 532. 
113. For surveys of the evidence, see, for example, BRENNAN, supra note 37, at 55– 
56; DIANA C. MUTZ, HEARING THE OTHER SIDE: DELIBERATIVE VERSUS PARTICIPATORY 
DEMOCRACY 32–33 (2006); SOMIN, supra note 15, at 92–104. 
114. See generally, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY
(2004); LEIB, supra note 47; CLAUDIO LÓPEZ-GUERRA, DEMOCRACY AND DISENFRANCHISEMENT: 
THE MORALITY OF ELECTORAL EXCLUSIONS (2014); Hélène Landemore, Deliberation, 
Cognitive Diversity, and Democratic Inclusiveness: An Epistemic Argument for the Random 
Selection of Representatives, 190 SYNTHESE 1209 (2013); Claudio López-Guerra, The 
Enfranchisement Lottery, 10 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 211 (2011). 
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together about them.115  More commonly, proposals to increase deliberation 
rely on “sortition”: randomly selecting a small, representative fraction of 
the population to make decisions on behalf of the rest.116  Because each of 
the voters in the small group chosen by sortition would carry far greater 
weight than a vote in a conventional election, the participants would have 
incentives to seek out more information, and consider it more carefully. 
Some sortition proposals would rely on the small groups to make policy 
decisions across the board, or to select political leaders in place of the
broader, conventional electorate.117 Others would give each small group of
sortition selected voters a different, more narrowly defined task, such as 
deliberating over one particular area of policy.118 
In previous work, I have criticized different variants of these proposals 
in some detail.119  Here, I emphasize a few key points that are especially
relevant to the issue of political freedom. 
First, even if these proposals for increasing deliberation work exactly 
as advertised, they still would not change the fact that almost all voters have
only an infinitesimal chance of influencing policy outcomes.  Where the 
deliberation in question is conducted by the entire voting population, each
individual’s likelihood of influencing the outcome would be about the same 
as before, even if they ended up casting their votes in a better-informed
manner. 
Where the deliberation is conducted by a small group selected through
sortition, those selected might potentially have very great influence.  But 
those not selected by the sortition process would have even less ability to 
influence policy than before.  Here, as elsewhere, increasing the political
influence of one part of the population results in reducing the influence of 
others.120 
The second problem is that deliberation proposals are unlikely to result 
in the sorts of improvements in political knowledge that advocates claim.
There are several massive obstacles to such success: one is that the enormous
size and scope of modern government make it difficult for participants to 
become informed on more than a fraction of the relevant issues.121  The
deliberators can only do so if they serve as members of the “sorted” group 
115. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 114, at 3.
 116. See SOMIN, supra note 15, at 208–10 (discussing examples). 
117. See, e.g., Landemore, supra note 114, at 1210; López-Guerra, supra note 114, 
at 211–12. 
118.  For a discussion of this possibility, see SOMIN, supra note 15, at 210. 
119. See id. at 204–11; Somin, supra note 111, at 253–55; Ilya Somin, Jury Ignorance
and Political Ignorance, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1167, 1179–87 (2014). 
120. See SOMIN, supra note 15, at 210–11. 
121.  On this point, see id. at 208–09. 
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for a very long time, thereby becoming a kind quasi-professional political
class of the type that sortition is intended to avoid in the first place.122 
The experience of juries in the legal system suggests that lay jurors have
great difficulty dealing with complex scientific evidence and large-scale
policy issues that come up in some cases.123  This suggests they are likely 
to have similar or greater difficulty in dealing with public policy issues in
settings where they are likely to have broader responsibilities than on a jury.
These problems can, to some degree, be mitigated by giving each group 
selected through sortition only a narrow area of responsibility.  But that in
turn creates serious difficulties in ensuring that the different groups do not
work at cross-purposes and in handling resource tradeoffs between the 
issues handled by different groups.124 
Whether they rely on sortition or on deliberation by the entire community
of voters, deliberative democracy proposals are also highly vulnerable to
manipulation by politicians and interest groups.125  Someone has to decide
what issues will be on the agenda, which groups will handle which questions,
and who will get to submit information or make presentations to the 
deliberators. For obvious reasons, each of these choices is ripe for abuse, 
and real-world interest groups and political leaders are likely to exploit them.126 
To the extent that deliberative democrats seek to promote decision-
making that is well-informed, they would be well advised to reconsider at 
least some of their traditional skepticism of foot voting mechanisms.  The 
latter incentivizes well-informed decision-making without requiring reliance
on some small segment of the population, or opening the door to agenda
manipulation by powerful interest groups.  It also enables a wide range of
people to make choices that are individually decisive. 
Foot voting cannot meet all the requirements of deliberative democracy, 
especially in its more demanding forms, which require a high degree of
sophisticated thinking.127  But it is at least likely to result in better-informed 
and more thoughtful decision-making than ballot box voting.128 
122. See id. at 208. 
123.  See Somin, supra note 119, at 1179–87. 
124.  See SOMIN, supra note 15, at 210–11. 
125.  See id. at 206–09. 
126.  For a more detailed discussion, see id. 
127.  See generally id. at 58–61. 
128.  For more extensive discussion, see id. at ch. 5. 
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VII. IS FOOT VOTING TRULY “POLITICAL”? 
Despite its advantages over ballot box voting, many might be tempted
to dismiss the efficacy of foot voting as a mechanism for political freedom
because the motivations of most foot voters are not sufficiently “political.” 
Critics point out that the motivations of many foot voters are actually
primarily economic: seeking out jobs and housing, for example.129  Thus,
perhaps foot voting cannot be considered a form of political choice. 
Such criticism ignores the fact that economic opportunities are often 
closely tied to public policy decisions: for example, job opportunities are 
often determined in large part by government policy decisions on labor 
markets, while housing costs are in large part the product of zoning decisions.130 
Seemingly economic choices are usually at least in significant part political. 
The same is true of foot voting decisions made in the private sector, at 
least with respect to issues that might otherwise be controlled by the
government.  Choices between private planned communities, for example,
are often based on considerations of quality and cost similar to those that 
influence foot voting decisions between local governments.131 
If foot voting decisions based on economic considerations do not qualify
as exercises of political freedom, the same applies to many ballot box voting
decisions.  The biggest determinant of most electoral outcomes is the recent 
performance of the economy, often based on exercises of crude retrospective
voting that gives little or no consideration to the extent to which incumbents 
are truly responsible for current economic conditions or not.132 
In many cases, moreover, foot voters are not motivated solely or even 
primarily by narrowly economic considerations.  The most obvious examples
are migrants and refugees fleeing war or oppressive regimes of various kinds.
Many internal migrants also fit that description, such as unpopular minorities
moving to more tolerant jurisdictions. 
129. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Legal Sources of Residential Lock-Ins: Why French
Households Move Half as Often as U.S. Households, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 373, 395–97; 
Paul W. Rhode & Koleman S. Strumpf, Assessing the Importance of Tiebout Sorting: Local 
Heterogeneity from 1885 to 1990, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1648, 1649 (2003). 
130. On the importance of zoning in determining housing availability and cost, see 
generally Chang Tai-Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21154, 2017).  For an overview of the 
evidence, see Edward Glaeser, Reforming Land Use Regulations, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 
(Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/reforming-land-use-regulations/amp
[https://perma.cc/2Q94-BPKB]. For more detailed discussion of the relevance of policy 
to foot voting decisions, see SOMIN, supra note 15, at 167. 
131. See generally SOMIN, supra note 5 (manuscript at ch. 4). 
132. For a recent overview of the ubiquity of crude economic retrospective voting, 
see ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 37, at 146–213. 
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It is also possible to argue that foot voting does not qualify as a meaningful 
endorsement of the political system chosen by migrants, because the latter
are often fleeing terrible conditions out of desperation.  Some move because
“anything is better” than the awful status quo where they currently reside. 
But if terrible initial circumstances undermine the validity of foot voting 
decisions, the same is often true of ballot box voting decisions.  Elections 
often turn on voters’ rejection of what they see as a badly flawed status 
quo. The point is not that foot voting is ideal in this respect, but that
it outperforms ballot box voting by enabling individuals to make more 
decisive choices, and giving them better incentives to become informed. 
Moreover, even if the initial impulse to move is a result of terrible
conditions, foot voters can still exercise meaningful choice if they have a 
wide range of options.  That can occur in a federal system with a variety
of jurisdictions, through international migration (if there are a wide range 
of nations open to migrants), or in the private sector.  In such a situation, 
a foot voter’s choice among multiple possible destinations does carry an 
element of endorsement, even if she initially decided to consider moving
primarily to escape terrible circumstances. 
Availability of a wide range of options can also mitigate the potential 
danger that migration will increase heterogeneity of preferences in a jurisdiction,
thereby making it more difficult to satisfy a large proportion of them 
simultaneously.  If there is a wide range of options available to potential
movers, the latter can choose ones where the existing package of policies 
set by current residents fits their needs well.  In that scenario, many individual 
jurisdictions will be relatively homogenous in the preferences of their
residents, but the existence of extensive “second order diversity” between
jurisdictions creates a broad range of choice for foot voters.133 
Finally, foot voting might not be properly political because it may not 
communicate any clear message as to why the movers chose one jurisdiction
over another.  If I move from Jurisdiction to A to Jurisdiction B, it might 
be difficult for government officials and others to figure out which policy
differences were factors in my choice.  Fortunately, the effectiveness of
foot voting as a mechanism of political choice does not depend on effective 
communication of this type. Even if no one else knows why any given
set of foot voters acted as they did, they themselves presumably know, 
and still were able to choose which policies they wish to live under.  If I 
133. See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099,
1102–04 (2005). 
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move because my new jurisdiction has lower taxes, a cleaner environment, 
or better schools, I can enjoy the benefits of those policies even if no one else
knows that was my motivation.
To the extent clear communication is desirable, it can be partially achieved 
through studying patterns of foot voting choices.  For example, data indicate
that American movers tend to seek out areas with relatively lower taxes,
greater job opportunities, and relatively inexpensive housing.134  Local and 
regional governments seeking to attract migrants can take account of these 
preferences, and plan accordingly. 
Such communication is necessarily imperfect.  But the same is true to 
an even greater extent of ballot box voting, where it is often difficult or
impossible to tell whether the winner of an election truly has a mandate
for his or her policies and, if so, which ones.135 
VIII. CONCLUSION
Foot voting has major advantages over traditional ballot box voting that 
often make it a more effective tool for expanding political freedom.  Those 
advantages stem from the fact that it allows individuals to make decisive 
choices, and thereby also incentivizes them to be well-informed.  Foot voting
cannot completely displace the ballot box as a mechanism of political choice.
But expanding its domain can nonetheless have great value. 
134. See generally Nathan J. Ashby, Economic Freedom and Migration Flows between
U.S. States, 73 S. ECON. J. 677 (2007). 
135. On the difficulties of determining whether and to what extent a mandate exists, 
see generally LAWRENCE J. GROSSBACK, DAVID A.M. PETERSON & JAMES A. STIMSON, MANDATE 
POLITICS (2007). 
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